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IN A 2002 SUPREME COURT DECISION, WHICH SHIFTED
LANDOWNER AND GOVERNMENT EXPECTATIONS
REGARDING TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS, THE
COURT HELD THAT TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
MORATORIA DURING THE PREPARATION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE PLAN DO NOT
CONSTITUTE TAKINGS REQUIRING COMPENSATION.
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V TAHOE
REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
Heather Cobun
INTRODUCTION
A nearly twenty five-year push-pull between the federal govern-
ment's right to regulate land use and the rights and expectations of
landowners reached a tenuous resting place in 2002. In Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme
Court held that temporary construction moratoria are not govern-
ment takings requiring compensation.' Specifically, when a morato-
rium is placed on development while an agency devises a
comprehensive land use plan, there is no compensation owed to those
who are prevented from building while the plan is being developed.'
In the nine years since the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra,
District Courts have rarely recognized a moratorium as a regulatory
taking or due process violation despite the Court's recognition that
moratoria lasting more than one year could raise suspicions.' Tahoe-
Sierra reaffirmed a commitment to the framework of Penn Central
1. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 304 (2002).
2. Id. at 342.
3. "It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year
should be viewed with special skepticism. But given the fact that the District
Court found that the thirty-two months required by TRPA to formulate the
1984 Regional Plan was not unreasonable, we could not possibly conclude
that every delay of over one year is constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at
341-42.
See also Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850,
850 (2005) (upholding a district court's dismissal of a claim that a twenty-
one-month moratorium constituted a taking). Ecogen, LLC v. Town of It-
aly, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 162 (W.D.N.Y., 2006) (holding that a two-year
moratorium on construction of wind turbines and substations was not un-
constitutional despite stymying the plaintiffs business plans and endanger-
ing contracts).
95
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Transportation v. City of New York.4 The factors to be considered in
determining a regulatory taking are the economic impact of the regu-
lation and the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed
expectations as well as the character of the invasion.' Decisions prior
to Tahoe-Sierra held that when a regulation is invalidated by a court,
the government must compensate affected parties for the time when
they were deprived of their property rights and that a deprivation
which is permanent and then amended later to allow development
can be a taking.'
In the years since Tahoe-Sierra, lower courts have relied on the Su-
preme Court view that a moratorium is not a per se taking and have
emphasized the procedural steps that complaining parties take before
bringing a takings claim.' These courts have also struggled with the
correct application of the Penn Central analysis, including how to ap-
proach the factors Justice Brennan lays out and how to weigh the rele-
vant facts once they are distilled.' The courts are also recognizing the
potential for government planning agencies under the Tahoe-Sierra
ruling to use temporary development restrictions, such as moratoria
to control who can build in their region, a power which has opened
the door to complaints alleging not only regulatory takings but due
process and prior restraint violations as well.'
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1922,Justice Holmes recognized that "while property may be reg-
ulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking.""o Over the past several decades, courts frequently
cited Holmes' language and sought to determine when a regulation
went "too far."" In 1978, the Court handed down Penn Central, which
4. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5. Id. at 124.
6. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
7. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, 428 U.S. at 304; see
also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
8. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, 428 U.S. at 304; see
also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
9. See ASF, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107 (D. Wash, 2005)
(holding that a 17-year moratorium on issuing adult entertainment licenses
was unconstitutional prior restraint). . 30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503
(2011) (exploring the relationship between Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act and claims of unconstitutional land use regulations which violate sub-
stantive or procedural due process).
10. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a regula-
tion forbidding a landowner from mining under their property and threat-
ening other structures was not a valid exercise of the police power and
cause such a diminution in value as to become a taking requiring
compensation).
11. Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2002).
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held that a regulation forbidding the drastic alteration of historic
landmarks may be upheld as a use of police power. 1 2 The Court also
stated that the taking does not require compensation despite under-
cutting a potential avenue for profit the owners sought to explore.'
Part of the legacy of the decision came from the factors established by
Justice Brennan that are used to determine a regulatory taking
through ad hoc factual inquiries including: the economic impact of
the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the invasion, whether it is
physical or regulatory.14
Using the Penn Central factors, the Court found two temporary regu-
latory takings where property owners were virtually deprived of all use
of their land." In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,
the landowner claimed that an ordinance denied all use of it's prop-
erty and sought compensation for the time it was prohibited from
construction on it's land when the ordinance was later invalidated.'"
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that tem-
porary deprivations "are not different in kind from permanent tak-
ings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation." 7
The Court was careful to limit its holding to the issue presented, and
to state that the decision did not encompass "normal delays" in build-
ing such as obtaining permits and seeking variances." In his dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that there should be a strong presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the state and that the appellant did not
actually allege wrongdoing on the government's behalf before seeking
compensation.19 Furthermore, Justice Stevens claimed that the major-
ity misread takings clause precedent by finding that a regulation,
which would constitute a taking if it remained in effect permanently,
requires compensation for the time it is in place even if it is later inval-
idated or removed.o
Five years later, the Court addressed the question of duration of the
taking again in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council." The peti-
12. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
13. Id. ("the submission that appellants may establish a 'taking' simply by show-
ing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that
they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite simply
untenable .
14. Id. at 124.
15. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, 428 U.S. at 304.
16. Id. at 304-05. A Los Angeles County ordinance prohibited construction or
reconstruction on a flood protection area where appellant owned land and
had a building destroyed by a flood. Id.
17. Id. at 318 (holding that when a private party is so burdened by a govern-
mental action that it amounts to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause
requires payment for the use of the land).
18. Id. at 321.
19. Id. at 327.
20. Id. at 329.
21. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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tioner was denied the ability to build when the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act was enacted in 1988 and the Act included two residential
lots he purchased as "critical areas" where further development was
prohibited." Lucas did not challenge the Act's validity, but sought
compensation as it rendered his land devoid of "all economically ben-
eficial use."" Though an amendment after the trial court decision
created an exception for Lucas' purpose, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion held that the case should not be dismissed on ripeness
grounds and that at the time of the trial the taking was "unconditional
and permanent."24 Lucas was entitled to compensation for the per-
manent taking of his property because he was deprived of all eco-
nomic use and value.25 In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
affirmed that if the regulation were a taking, "its limited duration will
not bar constitutional relief."" Justice Blackmun's dissent criticized
the majority for finding that the land had lost all of its value when
Lucas could still enjoy the right to exclude and alienate and he also
was able to camp or picnic on his land.27 justice Stevens objected to
announcing a per se rule that could too easily burden the govern-
ment's ability to regulate for health and safety and seemed to ignore
the ad hoc, factual inquiries of Penn Central.2
When it granted certiorari for Tahoe-Sierra in 2002, the Court ad-
dressed the unique question of whether a moratorium on develop-
ment imposed during the creating of a comprehensive land-use plan
is a per se taking requiring compensation.2 ' The case arose when the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was created to harmonize
efforts between multiple states to preserve the beauty of the Lake
Tahoe area, which was suffering from the rapid development in the
22. Id. at 1008. Lucas and others began residential development in the late
1970s and Lucas purchased two lots for $975,000 on the Isle of Palms. Id. at
1006-07. No portion of the lots were "critical areas" under the 1977 Coastal
Zone Management Act at the time of purchase, but the 1988 act established
a baseline inland behind which construction was permitted and Lucas' lots
were between the baseline and the shore. Id. at 1007-08.
23. Id. at 1017.
24. Id. at 1012.
25. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035.
26. Id. at 1033.
27. Id. at 1044. Blackmun chastised the majority for confusing "less value" with
"valueless" and for rooting its decision that all economic value has lost on
an appraiser's valuation based on the highest val'ue use of the land. Id. Jus-
tice Stevens also dissented and argued that the court's decision was too
arbitrary when a landowner whose property loses 95% of its value cannot
recover compensation but one whose land is found to have lost 100% of its
value is fully compensated. Id. at 1065.
28. Stevens disagreed with the emphasis on the economic impact of the regula-
tion and its effect on investment-backed expectations and apparent lack of
regard for the character of the invasion. Id. at 1070-71.
29. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 302 (2002).
2011] Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 99
region.o The TRPA enacted two ordinances halting construction and
development to remain in effect until a comprehensive plan was
passed." The petitioners, developers, and individual landowners,
who were prohibited from developing their land for nearly three years
as a result of the moratoria, claimed a regulatory taking without just
compensation. Citing Lucas, the District Court found a total taking
and temporary deprivation of all economically viable use and rejected
the TRPA argument that the ordinances were reasonable temporary
actions while the government devised a comprehensive plan." The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Lucas by claiming that it
applies to the rare case when a regulation denies all productive use of
a parcel while the moratoria are only a "temporal slice" of the fee
interest and are a well-established form of regulation."
Echoing his dissent in Lucas, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority
and criticized the proposed per se rule for its overbreadth, where "it is
enough that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation-no mat-
ter how brief-of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule
that a taking has occurred."" A temporary restriction does not re-
move all economic value from a parcel because the property's value
will return when the restriction is lifted." The time period of a depri-
vation should not be given exclusive significance in the Penn Central
analysis, especially when a satisfactory deliberation period is vital to
good decision making when devising a comprehensive plan. 7 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent and argued that the actual time of
deprivation was nearly six years because after the thirty-two-month
moratoria and later injunction, development was prohibited from
1981 until 1987." The driving force behind the majority's decision
seemed to be that the moratoria were, by definition, temporary, and
in Lucas the restriction was labeled as permanent at the time of its
enactment and this allowed Lucas to recover compensation for the
time he could not use his land.
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id. at 306-12. The agency enacted Ordinance 81-5 imposing a moratorium
to be in effect from August 24, 1981 until the adoption of a permanent
plan, but when the deadline for a plan passed a second ordinance (Ordi-
nance 83-21) was enacted extending the moratorium which remained in
effect until the new regional plan was adopted on April 26, 1984. Id. at 305.
The moratoria amounted to a thirty-two-month ban on all construction. Id.
at 302. A challenge to the plan led to the District Court injunction continu-
ing to prohibit construction until a new plan was adopted in 1987. Id.
32. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 313.
33. Id. at 316.
34. Id. at 319.
35. Id. at 320. Land-use regulations can easily impact property values tangen-
tially and to treat them all "as per se takings would transform government
regulation into a luxury few governments could afford." Id. at 324.
36. Id. at 332.
37. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 337-39.
38. Id. at 344.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Is Reluctant to Announce a New Per se Taking Rule
that Could Be Overbroad and Lower Courts Apply the Decision Strictly.
Only two per se rules exist in takings law: a permanent physical inva-
sion and a deprivation of all economically beneficial use via regula-
tion.3 9 The Tahoe-Sierra majority explicitly declined to extend this
short list to include moratoria that temporarily halt development.4 0
Justice Stevens repeated his concern that if the court continued to
announce categories of per se takings, it would add to a litany of regu-
lations the government could not attempt without paying compensa-
tion, including "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like."41
In this practical manner, the Tahoe-Sierra majority dismisses possible
unfairness to landowners and faces the reality that if moratoria are
considered regulatory takings requiring compensation, then some
governments will not be able to afford to put them in place.4 2 In sub-
sequent lower court decisions, few landowners have been able to
mount a successful case to fight a moratorium despite the Supreme
Court's suggestion that one lasting more than one year may be sus-
pect." In Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed judgment for the city and denied a
claim that a twenty-one-month moratorium on building permits con-
stituted a regulatory taking." In Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, a New
York District Court found that a two-year moratorium on the building
of structures related to wind energy was not a taking, and the court
cited the Tahoe-Sierra decision and held that there is "no bright-line
rule as to how long a moratorium can remain in effect without tread-
ing upon constitutional rights."
39. Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 854 (2005).
40. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 304.
41. Id. at 303 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). "The interest in facili-
tating informed decisionmaking [sic] by regulatory agencies counsels
against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their
deliberations." Id. at 339.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 34142.
44. Wild Rice, 705 N.W.2d at 852-53. Wild Rice purchased farmland in anticipa-
tion of it becoming a part of the city and planned a subdivision. Id. at 852.
The land was subject to severe flooding and the city placed a moratorium
on building permits for new construction in the floodway which included
several Wild Rice lots. Id.
45. Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 162 (W.D.N.Y., 2006).
Ecogen sought to construct wind energy projects between Prattsburgh and
Italy, NY. Id. at 152. Italy passed a moratorium on all wind turbine towers
and support facilities while the town adopted comprehensive zoning. Id.
The original period was six months but was extended to be in effect for two
years. Id. at 162.
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The ramification the Supreme Court envisioned in Tahoe-Sierra was
that "landowners will have incentives to develop their property quickly
before a comprehensive plan can be enacted," leading to ill-conceived
growth." The dissent, on the other hand, faced the other harsh real-
ity: that a thirty-two-month moratorium on development was only a
part of the big picture of a six-year halt to construction while property
was held in limbo." In Wild Rice and Ecogen, trial courts adhered to
the announcement that moratoria would not be per se takings while
merely acknowledging the Tahoe-Sierra majority's notion that their du-
ration - both of these were approximately two years - could subject
them to takings status.
B. Lower Courts Struggle with How to Approach a Potential Regulatory Tak-
ing, Including the Procedures and Administrative "Hoops" that Must Be
Completed Prior to a Claim.
The Supreme Court placed an emphasis on semantics in the takings
clause cases - First English, Lucas, and Tahoe-Sierra - and sometimes the
majority's logic turned on the language used in a regulation and the
order in which a petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the law
and its implementation without compensation." A driving force be-
hind the decision in Lucas was the fact that when the Beachfront Man-
agement Act was passed, it affected a permanent ban on construction
on Lucas' lot." The majority found that at the time "the taking was
unconditional and permanent," and therefore Lucas should have
been compensated."o The Lucas application was rejected as to mora-
toria because they are by nature temporary and land value will return
when the restriction ends.5 1 Justice Thomas' dissent criticized the ar-
gument that the property will recover value once the prohibition is
lifted as "cold comfort to the property owners in this case or any
other.""
A major point of contention in Lucas was the ripeness of the suit
because the amended Beachfront Management Act allowed for spe-
cial permits for habitable structures after the briefing and argument
before the South Carolina Supreme Court.53 The dissent in Lucas
opined that the landowner must pursue this option and be denied
46. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 339.
47. Id. at 343.
48. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 339.
49. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
50. Id. at 1012.
51. See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.
Q. 307, 333 (2007).
52. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 356.
53. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011.
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before he could move forward with his claim for relief." Lucas also
never challenged the original setback line." The dissent argued that
the taking cannot be terribly egregious if Lucas did not contend that
the regulation was invalid to begin with.
Subsequent applications of the decision have also paid attention to
semantics and procedure - not just by the label of the regulation but
also by strictly construing the two requirements for a ripe takings
claim: finality and exhaustion. In Ecogen, the plaintiff wind energy
company did not seek a hardship exception available during the mor-
atorium period that could have allowed the company to build.
Ecogen argued that this should not impact its takings claim because
the company repeatedly appealed to the board to reconsider the mor-
atorium and that the application for an exception would be futile
"given the Board's overt hostility to the Italy Project."5 Similarly, the
plaintiff in Watson Construction Co. Inc. v. City of Gainesville did not seek
a hardship exception to construct an asphalt plant "because of its be-
lief that an exemption would never be approved."O When the com-
pany did pursue a hardship exemption Watson's counsel did not
include a thorough account of the facts and repeatedly called the
hearing "an exercise in futility," which the court did not give credence
to in finding that all avenues had not been exhausted." The Ecogen
decision acknowledged that the ripeness requirement does not re-
quire a lengthy procedure to be followed, the foreseeable end of
which is a "brick wall."" However, trial courts seem to be requiring
just that. Both decisions acknowledged legislative hostility toward the
54. Id. at 1041-42. The majority chose to proceed on a "temporary takings"
theory based on the period when Lucas had no option to build. Id. at 1011-
12.
55. Id. at 1042-43.
56. Id. at 1043.
57. See Watson Construction Co. Inc. v. City of Gainesville, 433 F. Supp. 2d
1269, 1282-83 (2006) (citing Williamson County Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193). Finality refers to whether the initial
decision maker has arrived at a definitive position and exhaustion refers to
the administrative and judicial procedures to seek review of the decision.
Id.
58. Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153-55 (2006). To apply
for a hardship exemption, the applicant must pay $500 with relevant facts
and documentation. Id. A public hearing is held within forty-five days and
the town board acts based on their findings. Id.
59. Id. at 153-55.
60. Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. In a "first-step" meeting with the city, the
company was told that the government would not pass a moratorium on
construction of asphalt and concrete plants unless citizens initiated the ac-
tion, which they did soon after. Id. at 1271. This led to the adoption of a
six-month moratorium. Id. at 1272.
61. Id. at 1283-84.
62. Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (citing Triple G Landfills v. Bd. of Comm'rs
of Fountain Cnty, Ind., 977 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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projects in question but did not view seeking hardship exemptions as
certain "brick walls."6 3
C. The Economic Impact and Duration of a Regulation Do Not Carry
Greater Weight than Other Factors in a Takings Analysis.
In both First English and Lucas, the majority opinion focused on the
loss of all economically viable use for the properties in question be-
cause government regulations forbid construction." Though two of
the factors in Penn Central revolve around the economic prospects of
the landowners (economic impact of the regulation and the extent to
which it interferes with investment-backed expectations), the Tahoe-
Sierra court stressed that they carry no more weight than other factors:
the character of the invasion and the government interest.65 Nor does
the duration of a temporary deprivation carry extra weight when de-
termining a taking." The opinion cited Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in finding that, ". . we do not
hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes
finding that it effects [sic] a taking; we simply recognize that it should
not be given exclusive significance one way or the other."" This refer-
ence to Palazzolo aided in clarifying " .. .such vexing and long-standing
issues as the relevance (if any) of a property owner's expectations
when a regulation destroys all economically beneficial use of her land,
and what criteria courts may consult to gauge whether an owner's ex-
pectations are reasonable."68
Armed with the knowledge that investment-backed expectations of
landowners and the length of moratoria do not carry substantial
weight in a Penn Central ad hoc factual inquiry, lower courts have ac-
63. Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 161("Here, it may be unlikely that defendants
would grant Ecogen a hardship exception from the Moratorium .... There
is obviously some hostility toward the project among some of the town.
That the availability of such an exception is doubtful is not enough, how-
ever."); Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (" [T] here certainly does seem to be
some hostility on the City's part toward the Watson project.").
64. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
65. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 320 (2002).
66. Id. at 335.
67. Id. at 337 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)). In
Palazzolo, the petitioner owned waterfront property which was designated as
coastal wetlands by law. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611. His development pro-
posals were rejected and he sued, claiming the application of wetlands reg-
ulations took the property without compensation. Id. The majority ruled
that not all of the petitioner's land was a part of the protected wetlands and
therefore he did not experience a total deprivation of all economic value.
Id. at 631.
68. J. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-
Backed Expectations After Palazzolo And The Lower Courts' Distrubing Insistence
On Wallowing In The Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 352, 354 (2005).
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knowledged the plight of plaintiffs while still upholding moratoria. In
Wild Rice, the landowners incorporated to develop a subdivision, con-
structed a connection to the sewer system, and entered an agreement
with the city for sewage treatment, all to comply with county and town-
ship regulations." The company invested $500,000 in developing and
promoting the subdivision only to have the moratorium passed while
city officials conferred with Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) representatives to plan for flooding emergencies.o No lots
were sold during the moratorium on building permits, but five were
sold after the moratorium was lifted.7 1 Wild Rice claimed the morato-
rium denied it all economically-viable use of its property after invest-
ing $500,000, "most of which was mandated by government entities,"
and sought more than one million dollars in damages.7 ' The trial
court found the damages claim to be vastly higher than what was rea-
sonable based on the pre-moratorium and post-moratorium sales and
cited Tahoe-Sierra in holding that that "[a] mere delay" was not a
taking.73
In Ecogen, when the government in Italy, New York, passed the mor-
atorium on wind energy facility construction, it did so intentionally to
impact the plaintiffs company, which needed to construct a substa-
tion in Italy to fulfill its contract with the neighboring town of Pratt-
sburgh, which welcomed the project. 74 Though Ecogen showed
financial harm through the continued extension of the moratorium,
it was not found to be a taking because it was not shown to be unrea-
sonable in duration.7 ' The court did acknowledge, however, that "it
does seem curious and suspicious that a two-year period is needed to
adopt a zoning plan for wind turbines" and ordered the town to enact
a plan within ninety days or render a decision on a hardship excep-
tion for the plaintiff.76
Like Wild Rice, the government in Watson also passed a moratorium
after a company had taken steps to begin their enterprise. Watson
contracted to purchase the land and spent more than $200,000 to
69. Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 852 (N.D.
2005).
70. Id. at 852-53.
71. Id. The moratorium was lifted in May 2000, after which lots were sold for
$39,200 in that month, $39,000 in March and November 2002, $55,900 in
July 2003, and $59,000 in April 2004. Id.
72. Id. at 857.
73. Id. at 858.
74. Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 152 (2006).
75. See id. at 153, 161.
76. Id. at 162.
77. See Watson Construction Co. Inc. v. City of Gainesville, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1269
(2006). In a "first-step" meeting with the city, the company was told that the
government would not pass a moratorium on construction of asphalt and
concrete plants unless citizens initiated the action, which they did soon af-
ter. See id. at 1271. This led to the adoption of a six-month moratorium. See
id.
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purchase and move an asphalt plant to the new site and more than
$100,000 in preparing plans for the project and "anticipated no
problems with the construction."" The purchase agreement expired
during the moratorium, and after the moratorium ended, a competi-
tor built an asphalt plant on the site in question." The court held
that the takings claim revolving around Watson's investment-backed
expectations was not ripe based on finality and exhaustion and did
not reach a Penn Central analysis.ao
The effect of the regulation on investment-backed expectations of
the landowner is not the paramount concern when determining a reg-
ulatory taking according to Tahoe-Sierra.s" Lower courts have abided
by this part of the decision." Investment-backed expectations must
be balanced with the character of the invasion and the government's
interest in health and safety; however, all three factors are devoid of
"bright lines" to limit confusion. 3 In future cases, those claiming a
regulatory taking cannot rely solely on a diminution in value or frus-
tration of development plans to request compensation but must place
weight on the other factors the court considers in its ad hoc, factual
inquiries.8 4
D. Constitutional Safeguards Are Inadequate to Protect Governments from
Manipulating the Planning Process to Control New Businesses.
The decision in Tahoe-Sierra was a victory for government planning
agencies. They would not be required to pay compensation to land-
owners who are located in areas in need of a comprehensive land use
plans in order to enact a moratorium on development while a plan is
devised." However, this decision also gives the government room to
manipulate what kind of people and businesses can build in their
area, a power that the court may not have intended or wished.
When a government can use innocent tools of planning such as con-
struction moratoria to halt building in certain regions, the results can
be less than desirable if a government acts in bad faith or with an
unsavory motive.
78. Id. at 1275.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1282.
81. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 319 (2002).
82. See Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 857 (N.D.
2005).
83. SeeJ. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-
Backed Expectations After Palazzolo And The Lower Courts' Distrubing Insistence
On Wallowing In The Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 352, 399 (2005).
84. "[L]andowners cannot expect to be compensated if frustration of their de-
velopment plans is the only factor supporting their claim." Id at 401.
85. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 302.
86. See id.
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Both the Ecogen decision in New York and the Watson decision in
Florida recognize aversion, if not outright hostility, to the projects in
question. In these cases, the takings claims were accompanied by
due process claims, where the courts were asked to determine if the
moratoria, both facially and as-applied, violated the due process rights
of the companies." A procedural due process claim challenges the
procedures used in adopting the regulation, and a substantive due
process claim challenges "arbitrary and capricious action" in adopting
the regulation." Ecogen asserted a substantive due process claim
that, on its face, the moratorium bore "no rational relationship to any
legitimate government purpose," and supported it by contending that
there was no reason to prohibit the construction of only wind power
substations and not all types of power stations, but this was deemed
insufficient.co The court, however, found that the moratorium was
not arbitrary or irrational enough to be a violation." Similarly, Wat-
son contended that the denial of their building permits was irrational
because other developers' plans were approved during that time.92
Likewise, the court found that the moratorium bore a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate government purpose. 3 Both cases saw chal-
lenges to the as-applied constitutionality of the moratoria dismissed
for lack of ripeness (finality and exhaustion)." In both Ecogen and
Watson, despite admitted hostility and moratoria, which were clearly
passed to halt the projects in question alone, plaintiffs could not re-
cover based on due process violations.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ruling in Tahoe-Sierra seemed on its surface to
be giving the government a fighting chance to devise comprehensive
land-use plans. The alternatives resulting from a per se rule, which an-
nounced that temporary construction moratoria are takings that re-
quire compensation, appeared to be devised based on the options to
either deal with nonconforming construction occurring during the
planning or paying owners for the time it takes to devise a plan. The
87. Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 161 (2006); see Watson,
433 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
88. See Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 154; Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
89. Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (citing Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. V. Leon
County, 121 F.3d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1997)).
90. Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 156-58.
91. Id. at 155.
92. Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1279-80.
93. See id. Reasons cited by the city included enabling the government to "re-
view, study, hold public hearings, and prepare and adopt an amendment or
amendments to the City of Gainesville Code of Ordinances," and protect-
ing and preserving the environment and safety of citizens. Id. at 1280.
94. See Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 160; Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
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government can either be rushed or pay for the privilege of being
thoughtful.
However, the reality for landowners is that in cases such as the Lake
Tahoe region, subdivisions in Fargo, North Dakota, wind energy com-
panies in Italy, New York, and asphalt plants in Gainesville, Florida, is
that they can be deprived of the ability to build on their land for years
and receive nothing for it. The Supreme Court believed that land
would regain value when moratoria were lifted, but in the interim the
realities of the construction industry can force development compa-
nies to abandon their plans and be seriously harmed financially by
having stagnant properties that they could no longer turn into
revenue.
Wild Rice River Estates could not sell lots in a subdivision for nearly
two years after investing to connect to the Fargo sewer system and
promote and develop its land." Ecogen risked losing a contract with
a neighboring town when Italy forbade construction of a substation."
Watson Construction Company lost money that it invested in an
asphalt plant and then lost the project itself when its contract to
purchase the property expired during the moratorium.9 7 Investment-
backed expectations may not be the only considerations when deter-
mining a taking, but they certainly bear more relevance than the
Tahoe-Sierra majority casually touches on and dismisses.
Even other constitutional safeguards can fail to protect businesses
from being targeted by moratoria as a result of the announcement by
the Supreme Court that such measures will not be deemed takings."
There appear to be extremely limited options available to businesses
that are singled out for construction moratoria, even when the mora-
toria are obvious and hostile. Tahoe-Sierra's majority may have allevi-
ated the fears of planning agencies that wish to halt construction
while they enact comprehensive zoning, but the Supreme Court also
gave governments another tool to abuse at the local level.
95. See Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 852 (N.D.
2005).
96. Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
97. Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
98. See Ecogen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 154; Watson, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
304 (2002).
